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Camino Santa Teresa 930, 10700 Mexico D.F., Mexico.Abstract.- We build a partial equilibrium model of ﬁrm dynamics under
exchange rate uncertainty. Firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and observe the current level of the real exchange rate each period. Given
their current level of capital stock, ﬁrms make their export decisions and
choose how much to invest. Investment is ﬁnanced through one period
loans from foreign lenders. The interest rate charged by each lender is
set to satisfy an expected zero-proﬁt condition. The model delivers a
distribution of ﬁrms over productivity, capital stocks and debt portfolios,
as well as an exit rule. We calibrate the model using data from a panel of
Mexican ﬁrms, from 1989 to 2000, and analyze the eﬀect of the 1994 crisis
o nt h e s ev a r i a b l e s . A sar e s u l to ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ed e p r e c i a t i o n ,
the model predicts: (i) an increase in the debt burden, (ii) an increase
in exports, and (iii) a large decline in investment. These real eﬀects are
consistent with the evidence for the Mexican crisis.
Keywords: Devaluation, Investment, Exports, Balance Sheet Eﬀects.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C51, E22, E32, E5, G31.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the past decade, several Latin American and East Asian countries have undergone
currency crises that have been accompanied by substantial falls in investment and
output. For instance, Mexico experienced in December 1994 a sudden real exchange
rate depreciation of 55%. The economy-wide GDP fell by more than 6% in 1995 and
capital investment dropped by more than 29% in the same period.
Previous quantitative structural models have explained the fall in output and
investment in terms of an exogenous drop in total factor productivity (see for example
Bergoeing et al. 2002). However, given the large change in the relative price of
domestic and foreign goods that was associated with these real eﬀects, it is reasonable
to expect that movements in the real exchange rate could have a role to play in
explaining movements in investment and output.
The existing literature has identiﬁed two main channels through which exchange
rate depreciations may aﬀect investment. (See for example Krugman 1999). First,
depreciations increase the competitiveness of ﬁrms in export markets and lead to
higher export revenues. Second, ﬁrms that hold foreign currency denominated debt
face an increase in the value of their liabilities in domestic goods. The former eﬀect,
termed the “competitiveness eﬀect” increases proﬁts and net worth, while the latter,
termed the “balance sheet eﬀect” reduces the net worth of ﬁrms. As the literature
on the ﬁnancial accelerator (see for example Bernanke and Gertler 1989) shows, in
a world of imperfectly competitive capital markets, changes to the net worth aﬀect
ﬁrms’ access to external funds and hence do have real eﬀects. We could expect to ﬁnd
a positive or a negative eﬀect of devaluation on investment and output, depending
on the relative strengths of the two eﬀects.
In this paper, we visit the same question, namely, how do depreciations aﬀect ﬁrm
investment. We build a model in which the which we can observe balance sheet and
competitiveness eﬀects. In addition, exchange rate movements also aﬀect the cost of
credit to ﬁrms in our model through two additional (opposing) channels. The interest
1rates charged to ﬁrms in foreign goods increase in the wake of a devaluation. This
eﬀect however, is mitigated by the fact that after a large depreciation, the expectation
of subsequent devaluations is substantially smaller. This reduces the value of future
expeditures (including debt repayments) in domestic goods. The net eﬀect of devalu-
ations on the cost of credit then depends on which of these eﬀects dominate. We are
t h e r e f o r ea b l et oe x a m i n et h ee ﬀects of real exchange rate movements on ﬁrms’ net
worth and cost of credit in a uniﬁed framework and quantify their eﬀect on output,
investment and debt.
The model is a partial equilibrium model of a small open economy with hetero-
geneous ﬁrms. There are two goods: a domestic and a foreign good. The relative
price of these two goods is the real exchange rate, that we assume follows an exoge-
nously give ﬁrst order Markov process. Firms produce domestic output using capital
through a decreasing returns technology. Domestic output can be transformed into
exports through a concave technology. In this way, we introduce in a simple way the
insight that ﬁrms cannot switch their production from domestic markets to exports
costlessly, due to, for example, an inelastic world demand for exports.
Firms accumulate capital over time. However, investment can only be ﬁnanced
through internal resources or by borrowing in the international capital market. Do-
mestic borrowing and equity issue are not important sources of funds for ﬁrms in
underdeveloped countries, because of participation constraints and/or high transac-
tion costs.1 Therefore, we abstract from these sources of ﬁnancing. Foreign debt is
denominated in units of the foreign good. In case of default, the foreign lender seizes
the current value of ﬁrm’ resources. The interest rate is ﬁrm speciﬁc, and equal to
the exogenous risk free rate adjusted for a risk premium. Competition among lenders
drives expected proﬁts to zero.2
1Dollar denominated debt as a proportion of total debt for our sample of Mexican ﬁrms has ranged
between 60% and 70% since 1993. There is also evidence that even ﬁr m sl i s t e di nt h eM e x i c a ns t o c k
market did not raise signiﬁcant resources through equity in that period.
2The model of ﬁrm dynamics that we use borrows from to Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Pratap
2Firms are heterogenous in their productivity, capital stock, and foreign debt. In-
dividual ﬁrms’ productivity follows a ﬁrst order Markov process. In the aggregate,
however, the only uncertainty is about the real exchange rate. Firms face an exoge-
nous death (turnover) probability each period which, together with ﬁrms defaulting
on their loans, generates exit in our model. Entry is exogenous, as new ﬁrms replace
those who exit. We focus on an invariant distribution of ﬁrms across states.
To calibrate the model, we use a panel of Mexican ﬁrms participating in the
stock market, between 1989 and 1994. These ﬁrms accounted for 80% of private
borrowing before the 1994-95 crisis. In this sense, it is a special sample for which we
should expect strong eﬀects of the real exchange rate depreciation. We use individual
ﬁrm’s data on capital, sales, and exports to construct the idiosyncratic productivity
processes. We then calibrate the key parameters so that the invariant distribution
of our model replicates some aggregate moments (as capital to sales, investment to
sales, exports to sales, debt to exports ratios, and exit rate) for these ﬁrms averaging
the 1989-94 period.
As an application, we use our quantitative model to analyze the eﬀects of the
1994-95 Mexican devaluation. We feed our calibrated model with the actual path
for real exchange rates between 1995-99 and analyze the response of ﬁrms to this
sequence of aggregate shocks. The results of our experiment are consistent with:
(i) an increase in the debt burden, (ii) an increase in exports, and (iii) a decline in
investment, immediately after the devaluation. In fact, we account for 85% of the
observed drop in investment in 1995 with our model. However, we are not able to
account for the sustained export boom in the second half of the 1990s, which can
probably be attrributed to structural changes in the economy such as NAFTA, and
the fast recovery of investement.
and Rendon (2003). In both models ﬁrm dynamics are determined by a combination of ﬁnancial
frictions and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The present model diﬀers from these models in that
we also have an aggregate shock to exchange rates which aﬀects net worth through its eﬀect on
exports, debt liabilities and the cost of credit.
3A growing body of theoretical literature on currency crises stresses shocks to ﬁrm
balance sheets as propagation mechanisms, such as Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) and Schneider and Tornell (2001).
There is also some empirical literature on the evidence of a balance sheet eﬀect on
investment. Bleakley and Cowan (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁr m st h a th o l dd o l l a rd e n o m i n a t e d
debt invest more than ﬁrms that do not, in other words, competitiveness eﬀects
outweigh the balance sheet eﬀect. Aguiar (2002) looks at the immediate eﬀect of the
crisis on investment and currency composition of debt in 1995 in Mexico. He ﬁnds
that investment was positively related to net worth, which in turn was adversely
aﬀected by the holding of dollar debt in this year. Pratap et. al. (2004) ﬁnd that
after 1994, exporters invested more than non exporters, and that ﬁrms that held
debt in dollars invested less than ﬁr m st h a td i dn o th o l dd o l l a rd e b tf r o m1 9 9 4t o
1996. However, to the extent that investment, export and borrowing decisions are all
m a d es i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,i ti sn o tc l e a rt h a tt h ee ﬀects identiﬁed in these papers can be
considered causal.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section sets out some features of the
data that we seek to understand. Section 3 describes the model economy. In Section
4, we characterize some properties of the solution. In particular, we show how the
interest rate charged by foreign lenders depends on ﬁrm’s characteristics. In Section
5 we calibrate the model to match some features of the Mexican economy between
1989 and 1994. Section 6 shows the results of the 1994-95 devaluation experiment.
The last section concludes.
2D a t a
The data used in this study consists of the balance sheets and income statements of all
ﬁrms listed in the Mexican stock market (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores or BMV). The
data is at a yearly frequency and covers the period 1989 to 2000. While the sample
4is restricted to publicly traded ﬁrms and ﬁrms that issue market debt, this does not
represent a serious limitation for our study. First, this is the only data set of its kind
available in Mexico and provides detailed information on the currency composition
and maturity structure of debt. Second, while small ﬁrms that are not listed on the
stock market could be exporters, they are not likely to have access to international
capital markets. Our sample therefore, contains the ﬁrms where we are most likely
to observe balance sheet eﬀects of devaluations.
Each ﬁrm in the sample has an identiﬁer, which allows us to link it across time.
The panel is not balanced and we do observe entry and exit. Exit can take place if a
ﬁrm is de-listed from the stock exchange, or if it merges with another one. In either
case, the BMV removes the ﬁrm from the panel. However, we retain ﬁrms, which are
de-listed in the panel for the entire period for which data is available.
Although the full sample includes 378 ﬁrms, only 339 ﬁrms were considered in the
empirical analysis. This follows from the following adjustments. First, we removed
ﬁrms with zero capital for one or more years. Second, we eliminated ﬁrms where the
capital stock was beyond the mean +/- 3 standard deviations for any one year.
Table 1 presents the sectoral composition of the ﬁrms in our sample. Roughly
half the ﬁrms are from the manufacturing sector and about 10% from construction.
At h i r do ft h eﬁrms are in the service sector, which mainly comprises of trading and
retail activities. There is also a handful of ﬁrms in transport and mining. About 15%
of the ﬁrms are not classiﬁed by sector and are grouped under the category “other”.
T a b l e2s h o w ss o m es u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sf r om 1989 to 1994 and illustrates the prop-
erties of the sample in the years preceding the exchange rate crisis. The real exchange
rate (pesos to dollar) is a series constructed by the Central Bank of Mexico. Firm level
data is expressed in real terms, and measured in pesos, deﬂated by the annual average
producer price index (base year=1994) before the ratios were constructed. Capital
stock was constructed by the perpetual inventory method using data on yearly in-
vestment expenditures. The book value of capital stock in the ﬁrst period the ﬁrm
5appears was used to initialize the series. Short term debt refers to dollar denomi-
nated debt liabilities with a maturity period of upto a year. Total debt includes both
short term and long term debt liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. The last
column of the table shows the ratio of net interest payments (interest payments less
interest recieved) to total short and long term liabilities, and is a measure of the cost
of credit.
T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea p p r e c i a t e dsteadily through this period as inﬂation in-
creased and the nominal exchange rate remained stable. From a level of about 4.6
pesos to the dollar in 1990, it moved to 3.9 pesos in 1992 and stood at a high of 3.5
pesos to the dollar in 1994 before the devaluation in December. The capital-sales was
relatively stable between 1990 and 1993 between 1.2 and 1.3, although it declined
slightly in 1994. Exports were relatively modest in this period, and accounted for
about 10% of total sales. The average investment to sales ratio in this period was
about 13 per cent, however there was a 3% increase in 1994, perhaps reﬂecting the
positive expectations engendered by NAFTA.
Firms also undertook increasing amounts of debt in this period. The short term
debt to exports ratio, which measures the ratio of foreign currency denominated
outﬂows to inﬂows,3 increased dramatically through this period. From relatively
moderate values of 0.7 in 1989, short term debt increased faster than exports and was
more than 1.5 times the value of exports by 1993. Total liabilities in foreign currency
were substantially more than double the level of exports in this period. This was
paralleled by relatively low costs of credit, which are shown in the last column of
Table 2. The ratio of interest payments to total liabilities was around 1 per cent
3Of course ﬁrms may have other foreign currency inﬂows such as income from ﬁnancial assets
held abroad or other hedging devices. Information on the currency composition of ﬁnancial assets is
not available from the balance sheet. We also do not have information on any other foreign currency
denominated outﬂows, such as imports of intermediate and capital goods. For the economy as
a whole, expenditures on imported capital goods were about 30% of total expenditure on capital
goods.
6upto 1992 and increased only slightly to 2.5 percent by 1993. On the eve of the 1994
crisis therefore, these ﬁrms were experiencing a modest boom. Investment was rising,
ﬁnanced by increasing amounts of relatively cheap dollar debt. The strong exchange
rate implied that exports accounted for a small proportion of sales and ﬁrms were
very imperfectly hedged against exchange rate risk.
What were the characteristics of the ﬁrms that contracted these large and increas-
ing amounts of debt? Tables 3 and 4 present some joint distributions for 1989 to 1994.
Both short and long term debt were strongly correlated with the amount of capital
stock the ﬁrm owned. Exports and debt were also correlated positively. In fact, we
see that ﬁrms that borrowed more than the 75th percentile accounted for almost 90
per cent of exports and 74 percent of capital stock. Firms with zero debt tended
to be very small both in terms of capital and sales. They also exported negligable
amounts.4
The exchange rate devalued sharply in December 1994. The real exchange rate of
1995 was 5.41 pesos to the dollar, almost 55 per cent higher than that of 1994, and
remained well above 1994 levels up to for the next four years. This had large eﬀects
on ﬁrm behavior, as Table 5 shows. The value of foreign currency denominated debt
in domestic goods shot up, and the short term debt to exports ratio increased from
1.5 to almost 1.8. This was accompanied by a substantial increase in the ﬁnancing
costs of liabilities, from 2.5 to 14 percent of the value of total liabilities, implying
that even if ﬁrms had other investments for hedging exchange rate risk, the cost of
credit increased substantially. These shocks to the balance sheet and to the cost of
credit were reﬂe c t e di nt h ei n v e s t m e n td e c i s i o n so fﬁrm. The average investment to
sales ratio fell by 5 percentage points by 1995. Exports boomed, and doubled as a
proportion of sales in the immediate aftermath of the devaluation. Despite this boom
however, the debt to exports ratio declined only to 1.2, and ﬁnancing costs were still
4The reverse is not however true. Firms with zero exports accounted for more than 13% of total
debt in the sample between 1989 and 1994.
76 per cent of total liabilities in 1995.
By 1996, ﬁrms made some eﬀorts to align short term foreign currency denominated
debt with exports. This ratio fell marginally below 1 in 1996, for the ﬁrst time since
1989. In subsequent years the amount of short term debt undertaken by ﬁrms fell
steadily till it was about 70 percent of total exports. This was accompanied by a
corresponding decline in interest payments. Investment suﬀered from this lack of
ﬁnance and did not recover till 1998.
Table 6 presents the changes in the absolute magnitudes of capital stock, debt,
investment, exports and sales relative to 1994 values, which have been set to 100. As
was also shown in the previous table, the value of exports in real pesos doubled in
1995 and has remained at roughly that level since. Total sales in 1995 were practically
stagnant, suggesting a large decline in domestic sales. Thereafter, total sales grew
slower than exports. Domestic sales therefore, took a long time to recover. Short
t e r md e b ti nr e a lp e s o si n c r e a s e db y3 3p e rc e n ti n1 9 9 5 ,h o w e v e ri ts u b s e q u e n t l yf e l l
by about 20 percent in 1996 and a further 10 percent in the following year. Total debt
liabilities also increased by 17 percent in the immediate aftermath of the exchange
rate shock, and declined the following year.
Average investment declined by 40 percent in 1995 and remained below 1994 levels
levels for four years. Table 7 shows how this decline in investment was distributed
among ﬁrms with varying debt to exports ratios. It is striking that the largest fall in
investment between 1989-1994 and 1995-2000 was for the ﬁrms that had low exports
and high levels of debt. These ﬁrms reduced investment by 50 per cent. For ﬁrms
with high levels of debt and exports, the fall was much more modest at about 11 per
cent. It therefore seems that the fall in investment was related to the degree to which
the ﬁrm could insulate itself against exchange rate shocks.
Finally Table 8 shows the relation between our sample and some macro aggregates.
The ﬁrms in our sample accounted for about 12 to 15% of total investment in the
economy (including government investment) in the years upto 1994. The total debt
8in foreign currency contracted by the ﬁr m si no u rs a m p l ew a sm o r et h a n8 0%o ft h e
total borrowing abroad by the private sector in the years around the exchange rate
devaluation. Their exports however were just 18% of non-petroleum exports. The
balance sheet eﬀects for these ﬁrms can be expected to be more pronounced than for
the economy as a whole. In fact, the total investment in the economy declined by
29%, in 1994, however, these ﬁrms saw a substantially larger decline of about 38%,
since they were much more vulnerable to exchange rate risk.
3T h e M o d e l
We build a partial equilibrium model of a small open economy with heterogeneous
ﬁr m s .T h e r ea r et w og o o d s :ad o m e s t i ca n daf o r e i g ng o o d .W ed e n o t et h er e l a t i v e
price of foreign over domestic goods (i.e., the real exchange rate) by e.T h i s p r i c e
is a random variable which follows a ﬁrst order Markov process with support [e, e]
and conditional density dF (e0|e). A real depreciation of the domestic currency is
equivalent to a high realization of e.
We model the domestic production sector as a continuum of ﬁrms heterogeneous
in their level of capital K, their productivity, and their outstanding foreign debt B.
We assume that ﬁrms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks θ each period, which
also follow a ﬁrst order Markov process with support [θ,θ] and conditional density
dP (θ
0|θ).
Production and Exports At the beginning of each period, the real exchange rate
e and the idiosyncratic shock θ are realized. Given these realizations and the current
values of K ﬁrms produce θf (K) units of domestic good, where f is a concave
production function. Firms also choose the fraction of their output x devoted to
exports given a concave technology to produce the foreign good out of the domestic
9good ηg[xθf (k)], where η is a ﬁrm-speciﬁce x p o r t - t y p e5. The export decision is
static and independent of capital accumulation and its ﬁnancing. The value of a
ﬁrm’s production in domestic goods (or total value of sales) is given by
Y (K,e,θ,η) ≡ max
x∈[0,1]
{eηg[xθf (K)] + (1 − x)θf (K)} (1)
The dynamics of the ﬁrm is governed by the investment decision and its ﬁnancing.
Given their capital K, outstanding foreign debt B, the real exchange rate e and the
current productivity θ, ﬁrms choose their level of investment I,g i v e nt h el a wo f
motion for ﬁrm’s capital K0 =( 1− δ)K + I and a depreciation rate δ. Investment
must be ﬁnanced out of ﬁrms current resources (or net worth)
W (K,RB,e,θ,η) ≡ Y (K,e,θ,η)+( 1− δ)K − eRB
a n dn e wf o r e i g nb o r r o w i n gB0, subject to the non negative dividend constraint:
Y (K,e,θ,η)+( 1− δ)K − eRB + eB
0 − K
0 ≥ 0( 2 )
where R is the gross, ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate measured in foreign goods.
Interest Rate on Loans The interest rates of loans are set before uncertainty at
the period of repayment is realized. In case of default, foreign lenders have the right
to seize all the ﬁrms resources and the ﬁrm must exit. Foreign lenders have access
to an international credit market, with a risk-free interest rate ρ given. Competition
among lenders ensures that the ﬁrm speciﬁci n t e r e s tr a t ew o u l db ee q u a lt ot h er i s k
free rate, adjusted for a risk premium, so as to satisfy a expected zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n .
Consider the problem of the representative foreign lender. A loan of size B0 will
be repaid only if W (K0,R 0B0,e 0,θ
0,η0) ≥ 0, that is, if the value of the ﬁrm’s net worth
5To have a well deﬁned problem, we impose the following conditions on the production function f:
(i) f (0) = 0; (ii) f strictly increasing; (iii) f strictly concave, and (iv) f satisﬁes the Inada conditions:
limK→0 f0 (K)=+ ∞ and limK→+∞ f0 (K) = 0. Similarly, we assume: (i) g(0) = 0; (ii) g strictly
increasing; (iii) g strictly concave, and (iv) g satisﬁes the Inada conditions: limy→0 g0 (y)=+ ∞ and
limy→+∞ g0 (y)=0 .
10tomorrow is non-negative. Otherwise, the ﬁrm is liquidated and the foreign lender
seizes the value of ﬁrm’s collateral
Π(K,e,θ,η) ≡ Y (K,e,θ,η)+( 1− δ)K
measured in units of domestic output. For simplicity, we rule out the possibility of
renegotiating loans, i.e., the possibility to pay back current debt with new borrowing.
Competitive lending implies that the interest rate in foreign goods R
0 must satisfy












where π ≡ Pr[Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η) ≥ e0R0B0] is the probability of repayment and Ω ≡
{e0,θ
0| Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η) <e 0R0B0}. This condition implicitly deﬁnes a ﬁrm speciﬁc
interest rate R0 (K0,B0,e,θ,η) as a function of the ﬁrm’s type, the real exchange rate,
the size of the loan and the amount of capital accumulated for next period.
Bellman Equation for the Firm Let ρd be the domestic interest rate used by
ﬁrms to discount proﬁts, and λ an exogenous death (or turnover) probability. Deﬁne





1, if Π(K,e,θ,η) ≥ eRB
0, otherwise
which takes the value 1 whenever the ﬁrm is in a state in which the debt is repaid.
The ﬁrm’s dynamic optimization problem can now be written in recursive form as
Vη (K,RB,e,θ)= m a x
{K0,B0}
























subject to the conditions (1), (2), and (3). We also require B
0 ≥ 0, i.e., the ﬁrm
cannot accumulate resources other than capital stock.
11Aggregate Dynamics Each period, a fraction λ of ﬁrms exit the economy, together
with ﬁrms which default on their loans. We assume that these ﬁrms are replaced next
period by a similar mass of ﬁrms with: (i) the minimum level of capital, (ii) a level
of debt equal to a ﬁxed cost of entry φ, (iii) a random productivity draw, and (iv)
same export-type.
Let the measure µ(K,RB,θ,η) to represent the distribution of ﬁrms in the econ-
omy, so that the aggregate state for the economy is (µ,e). Given a current value for
the real exchange rate e, the distribution of ﬁrms µ evolves according to the operator
































By construction, it is the case that
R
K,RB,θ,η dµ(K,RB,θ,η)=1 ,s oµ is indeed a
probability distribution function.
The distribution of ﬁrms allow us to compute aggregate statistics for the economy,











0 (K,B,e,θ,η) − (1 − δ)K]dµ(K,RB,θ,η)





An invariant distribution for a constant real exchange rate e is a distribution of
ﬁrms µ∗ satisfying µ∗ = Teµ∗. In our benchmark economy, we focus on an invariant
distribution in which e takes its mean value. This is, we look for the asymptotic
distribution of ﬁrms shutting down the aggregate uncertainty in the economy.
4 Characterizing Optimal Firm’s Decisions
We begin our analysis characterizing some properties of the ﬁrm’s optimal decisions
and the interest rates for loans. We explain these properties intuitively in the text
and present a series of formal propositions with proofs in the Appendix.
4.1 The Export Decision and Firm’s Collateral
The ﬁrm faces an export decision, i.e., has to decide the fraction of output x devoted
to the export market. This decision is static, since output is determined . The optimal
export decision can be represented by a function x(K,e,θ,η) ∈ [0,1].
The optimal choice of x can be understood from Figure 1, which shows the trade
oﬀ between domestic and export production. Given K, θ and η, domestic goods can
be transformed into exports through the concave technology g(.). Au n i td e c l i n ei n
domestic output increases export output by ηg0 (xθf (K)) For an interior solution,






13The solution to this equation gives us x(K,e,θ,η). As e increases, exports become
more proﬁtable and x increases. It is also easy to see that given θ, K and e, a ﬁrm with
ah i g h e rη will export a higher share of its output compared to a ﬁrm with a lower η.
For the tangency condition to hold, a higher η will require a lower g0 (xθf (K)) which
c a no n l yb ea c h i e v e dw i t hah i g h e rx, given the concavity of g(xθf (K)). Similarly
an increase in K will increase domestic production more than it will increase exports,
since domestic goods require a transformation of capital through the function f (.)
whereas the production of exports necessitates a transformation of capital through
f (.)a n dg(.). Hence an increase in K will reduce the share of exports in total
production. A similar argument implies that, given η, higher θ ﬁrms will export a
smaller share of their output.
Replacing the optimal export decision in the deﬁnition of ﬁrm´s total resources
today we obtain the indirect function
Π(K,e,θ,η) ≡ eηg[x(K,e,θ,η)θf (K)] + (1 − x(K,e,θ,η))θf (K)+( 1− δ)K
which represents the current value of ﬁrm´s collateral in units of domestic output.
This collateral function is increasing in K and θ. It is also increasing in e and in
the ﬁrm’s export productivity η. These results are all proved in Proposition 2 in the
appendix.
Π(K,e,θ,η)/e represents the value of ﬁrm’s collateral in units of foreign output
and can be written as
Π(K,e,θ,η)
e






As e increases, we know that exports increase and domestic production declines. How-
ever, we saw earlier, that the increase in exports is less than the decline in domestic
production, given the concave export technology g(.), so that Π(K,e,θ,η)/e is de-
clining in e. This is an important feature of our model since the value of resources
14in foreign goods is collateral for borrowing. A depreciation in the real exchange rate
reduces the value of this collateral and reduces the capacity of ﬁrms to borrow. Given
the ﬁnancial market imperfections, this has real eﬀects on investment.
4.2 The Equilibrium Interest Rate
Consider a representative foreign intermediary lending B0 units of foreign output at
an interest rate R0 to a ﬁrm with productivity θ and export-type η. The proba-
bility of repayment π is deﬁned as π ≡ Pr[Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η) ≥ e0R0B0]w h e r ee0 and
θ
0 are the realizations of the real exchange rate and the productivity shock tomor-
row and K0 is the ﬁrm´s capital tomorrow. K0 of course is the result of an op-
timal decision rule implemented today as a function of the state (K,RB,e,θ,η),
w h i c hw et a k ef o rn o wa sg i v e n . W ea l s od e ﬁne the conditional probability πθ0 ≡
Pr[Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η) ≥ e0R0B0|θ




The probability of repayment depends on the interest rate charged by the foreign
l e n d e r ,t h eo p t i m a ld e c i s i o n sK0,B 0, and the realizations of e0 and θ
0. F o rt h i s ,l e tu s
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0,η)=e0R0B0},o t h e r w i s e
The cut-oﬀ level ˆ e represents the maximum real exchange level for which the ﬁrm
can honor the foreign debt contract. This level depends on the ﬁrm capital, debt,
and productivity tomorrow. Above this level, the ﬁrm defaults and the foreign lender
seizes all current collateral.
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1, if b e = e
0, if b e = e
F (ˆ e|e) ∈ (0,1), otherwise



















0|θ) − (1 + ρ)B
0 =0 ( 4 )
noting that both πθ0 and b e are functions of K0, θ
0, R0, B0,a n de. This condition
implicitly deﬁnes R0 as a function of K0, B0, e, θ,a n dη.
Firms with higher capital stock tomorrow will obtain loans at a lower interest
rate. The intuition for this is simple: A higher value of K0 will imply that the ﬁrm
has higher collateral tomorrow. Hence the cut oﬀ value of e0 upto which it is able
to pay its loans is higher, and the probability of default is lower, all other things
remaining constant. Similarly, a high value of η, by increasing the value of collateral
and reducing the risk of default, implies a lower interest rate.
W ec a na l s os h o wt h a tf o rag i v e nl e v e lo fK0, the interest rate is increasing in B0.
Ah i g h e rB0, all other things constant, will imply that the largest realization of the
exchange rate b e at which the ﬁrm is able to pay its debt, is lower. This increases the
probability of default and the lender charges a higher premium over the interest rate.
Proposition 5 in the appendix formalizes these arguments.
The eﬀect of the current interest rate e on the interest rate works in two ways.
Given K0 and B0 (which are themselves functions of e),6 ah i g hv a l u eo fe today implies
that the value of e0 tomorrow will also be high, given the persistence of the process
for the exchange rate. This will reduce the expected value of collateral tomorrow
6In this sense we are concerned with the direct eﬀect of e on the interest rate, not the indirect
eﬀects through changes in K0 and B0.
16and therefore raise the probability of default. Second, a high value of e will shift the
density f (e0|e) to the right. For inverted U shaped densities (including the normal
and the log normal), this will increase the density for high realizations of e0 and reduce
it for low realizations of e0.This implies that the probability of e0 being below a cutoﬀ b e
is reduced, i.e there is a smaller probability of repayment. In Proposition 6 we provide
conditions under which a depreciation of the real exchange rate increases/decreases
the interest rate.
4.3 Net Worth and Cost of Capital Eﬀects
We now summarize the results obtained so far, focusing on the diﬀerent eﬀects of a
real depreciation aﬀecting investment decisions. We divide these eﬀects in two groups:
net worth and cost of credit eﬀects.
Net Worth Eﬀects Firms’ net worth is deﬁned as total assets minus liabilities. In
ag i v e np e r i o d ,t h i si s
W (K,e,θ,η) ≡ Y (K,e,θ,η)+( 1− δ)K − eRB
From this deﬁnition, it is clear that the real exchange rate aﬀects ﬁrms’ net worth
through two opposite channels. As we have seen earlier, a real depreciation (e ↑)
increases exports, and hence Π(K,e,θ,η) and net worth. We call this the competi-
tiveness eﬀect. On the other hand, the depreciation increases the burden of foreign
debt in units of domestic output (eRB), for a given interest rate decided in the pre-
vious period, reducing net worth. This is the balance sheet eﬀect which has been
stressed in the literature.
Since net worth determines the internal resources available to a ﬁrm, the impact
of a depreciation on investment depends (everything else equal) on the relative im-
portance of these two eﬀects. A strong competitiveness eﬀect would imply a positive
relation between the real exchange rate and investment, while a strong balance sheet
eﬀect would have the opposite implication.
17The relative strengths of these two eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 2. The solid
line shows Π(K,e,θ,η)a saf u n c t i o no fe and the various dashed lines denote diﬀer-
ent levels of eRB. The solid line is convex in e until the point x =1 . The intuition
for this is the same as the intution for the convexity of a proﬁt function in prices.
As e increases, if the ﬁrm does not change its export decision, x, Π(K,e,θ,η)w o u l d
increase linearly. However, since the ﬁrm will re-optimize its export decision follow-
ing a change in e, the increase in Π(K,e,θ,η) is larger, leading to the convex shape
that we observe. When e is high enough and x =1 , the ﬁrm cannot increase ex-
ports any more, and the value of its resources can only increase linearly with further
increases in e. The net eﬀects of devaluation depend on the relative magnitudes of
Π(K,e,θ,η)+( 1− δ)K and eRB. For highly indebted ﬁrms, the balance sheet ef-
fect always dominates, whereas for ﬁrms with low debt, the competitiveness eﬀect
is stronger. For ﬁrms with debt levels between these two extremes, the eﬀect of de-
valuations depends on their magnitude. Moderate devaluations increase the value
of resources, but very small or very large devaluations have a negative eﬀect on net
worth.
Cost of Credit Eﬀects Firms ﬁnance their investment through their internal re-
sources and borrowing abroad. Consider a ﬁrm borrowing B0 units of the foreign
good today. This operation provides the ﬁrm with eB0 units of domestic output,
which can be devoted to investment in capital goods. Tomorrow, the ﬁrm expects to















is the expected devaluation rate. The cost of credit κ(e,R0)i sa ﬀected
b yt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t et h r o u g hi t se ﬀect on (i) the expected devaluation, and
(ii) the interest rate in foreign goods. With a mean reverting process for e,ah i g h
realization today implies a low expected devaluation rate. Hence, a real depreciation
18decreases the cost of credit through this channel (Fisher eﬀect) 7. On the other hand,
Proposition 6(i) in the appendix states conditions under which a high realization of e
increases the interest rate in foreign goods, increasing the cost of credit (interest rate
eﬀect).
Again, the impact of a depreciation on the cost of credit and investment depends
o nt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h e s et w oe ﬀects. Keeping net worth ﬁxed, a higher
cost of credit (due to a strong interest rate eﬀect) decreases investment, while a lower
cost of credit (due to a strong Fisher eﬀect) increases it.
5 A Quantitative Model Economy
We calibrate the model in order to match some statistics from our sample of Mexican
ﬁrms. For this, we make a strong assumption about stationarity, that is, we try to
reproduce the properties of the 1989-94 panel of ﬁrms as if this panel was extracted
from the invariant distribution of our model. As seen in Table 2, some key ratios
remained relatively constant during the pre-devaluation period. However, the 1989-
94 featured an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which is inconsistent with our
stationarity assumption. We see this exercise as a ﬁrst step in order to assess the
eﬀects of the 1994-95 devaluation.
5.1 Calibration Strategy
The main parameters of the model to be calibrated are α, the technology parameter,
ξ, the parameter for the transformation of domestic output into foreign output, δ,
the depreciation rate of capital, ρd, t h ed o m e s t i ci n t e r e s tr a t e( o rﬁrm’s discount
7Notice that if capital goods were units of foreign output (imports), there would be no Fisher
eﬀect in our model, since ﬁrms would care about the cost of capital in foreign units. We don’t have
data on imports of capital goods in our sample of Mexican ﬁrms. However, a rough estimate using
aggregate data suggests that imports account for only 30% of total investment.
19factor), ρ, t h er i s kf r e er a t ea b r o a d ,φ,t h eﬁxed cost of entry, and λ, the exogenous
turnover probability. In addition, we need to calibrate the process for θ, the ﬁrm
speciﬁc technology shock, the process for e, the exchange rate, and η which is the
idiosyncratic export-type of ﬁrms.
We choose an international risk free rate of 5%, consistent with the average post-
war US treasury bills rate, and a domestic interest rate of 13%, equal to the average
real return of Mexican treasury bonds (CETES) in the 1989-94 period. Given our
partial equilibrium setup, the stochastic process for the real exchange rate is also
calibrated outside the model. We restrict this process to follow the AR(1) process in
logs
loget+1 =¯ µ + γ loget + εt+1
where εt is a white noise with variance σ2
ε. Using annual data on the real exchange
rate for Mexico between 1989-2002, we estimate ¯ µ =0 .35, γ =0 .72, and σε =0 .145.
We then transformed it into a ﬁrst order discrete Markov process using the Tauchen
(1986) procedure, with a grid of 7 possible realization values.
The calibration strategy for the remaining parameters implies a complicated ﬁxed
point problem. First, given initial values for α and ξ,w ee s t i m a t et h ep r o c e s sf o rθ
and η using our sample of ﬁrms (the details are explained next). Second, given these
processes, we choose the values of α, ξ, δ, φ and λ so that the invariant distribution
reproduces the 1989-94 averages of the capital to sales ratio, the investment to sales
ratio, the exports to sales ratio, the foreign debt to exports ratio, and the exit rate
observed in our sample of ﬁrms 8. If the initial values of α and ξ are diﬀerent form
those obtained at the second stage, we update them and start again.
8These ratios are reported in Table 2 and discussed in the data section. Notice that, since debt
in the data is reported at the end of the period, the calibration target consistent with our model
is the average debt to exports ratio up to 1993 (or beginning of 1994), which is only 2.19. With
respect to the exit rate, we compute the fraction of ﬁrms which exit our sample of ﬁrms between
1989-94, which is roughly 11%. We are aware that this measure of turnover is problematic, since
ﬁrms de-listed form the stock market might still be active.
205.2 The Stochastic Process for Productivity and Export-types
Our panel of ﬁrms provides the data for the capital to sales and exports to sale
ratios, as well as the capital stock, for each ﬁrm and year between 1989-94. Given the
(initial) values of α and ξ,a n dt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ef o re a c hy e a r ,w ee s t i m a t et h e















ξ +( 1− x)θKα
where










is the optimal exports decisioni nt h et h e o r e t i c a lm o d e l .
N e x t ,w et a k ea v e r a g ev a l u e sf o rθ and η for each ﬁrm across the period 1989-94,
and discretize these values into an equally log-spaced 5 point grid. The transition
matrix for θ is calculated using the empirical distribution of the estimated values of
θ. In other words we counted the relative frequency of particular pair of (θ,θ
0)i nt w o
consecutive time periods, for all 25 possible combinations of (θ,θ
0)a n df o ra l lt i m e
periods.
5.3 Calibration Targets
Given the stochastic processes, we choose the values of α, ξ, δ, φ and λ so that the
invariant distribution reproduces some 1989-94 statistics. To construct this invariant
distribution, we solve the model by value function iteration. The steps are:
1. For each value of (K0,B0,e,θ,η) in the grids, we solve for the interest rate R0
which satisﬁes the zero-proﬁt condition for foreign lenders.
212. Given R0, we solve the dynamic programming problem at each point in the grid
for (K,RB,e,θ,η) using value function iteration. This gives us the policy rules
K0 and B0.
3. Given these policy rules and the transition function for the distribution µ,w e
ﬁx the real exchange rate e to its average level and iterate until obtaining an
invariant distribution µ∗ (e).
Table 9 presents the results of the exercise. We obtain a value for the capital
share in the production function of 0.36 and a depreciation rate of 11%, which are
close to the standard values obtained form calibration exercises using aggregate pro-
duction functions (see, for instance, Bergoeing et. al., (2002)). The implied value
for the elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate ( 1
1−ξ) is about 2.5. We don’t
have independent estimates for this elasticity, although we believe our number is
not unreasonable. Finally, we obtain a ﬁxed cost of 55 and an exogenous turnover
probability of 6%, from which we do not have independent estimates either. Under
this parametrization, the benchmark economy reproduces fairly well the statistics
observed in the 1989-94 data. If anything, we slightly underpredict the amount of
foreign debt in the model.
5.4 Other Statistics
In Table 10, we compare some additional properties of the invariant distribution of
ﬁrms generated by the model to the 1989-94 data. In our benchmark economy capital,
debt, exports and productivity (θ) are all positively correlated, which is also true in
the data. However, we generate a smaller correlation between debt and capital than
the one observed. This is because our exogenous exit rate dilutes these correlations by
adding a mass of ﬁrms with low capital and moderate debt. On the other hand, the
correlation between capital and productivity is too high, since the optimal amount of
capital to which ﬁrms converge is closely related to the productivity shock. Finally,
22the correlation between capital and exports, and debt and exports, is also too low in
the model. This is probably coming out of our assumption of stationarity of the real
exchange rate in the pre-devaluation period.
Table 10 also compares the average characteristics of ﬁrms which exit in the model
and in the data (i.e., ﬁrms delisted from our sample), relative to the total number
of ﬁrms. As in the data, ﬁrms which exit in our model are on average small and
have lower debt. Contrary to the data, however, low productivity ﬁrms exit in our
model, following a standard selection argument. We are surprised not to observe such
selection in the data. Exporters are also less likely to exit in the data than in the
model.
Summarizing, the calibration exercise provides us with a quantitative model that
reproduces some important features of the 1989-94 Mexican economy, or at least of
t h es a m p l eo fﬁrms that we are using. A richer model will be necessary to fully
reproduce the statistical properties of the panel of ﬁrms.
6 Experiment: The 1994-95 Devaluation
Using our calibrated model, we perform the following experiment. Starting from
the invariant distribution, which was assumed to represent the pre-1995 economy,
we simulate the evolution of the economy from 1995-99 feeding the model with the
observed path for the real exchange rate. This is, we start with a large depreciation
o ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ef o l l o w e db yap r o g ressive appreciation. Given the optimal
decision rules for ﬁrm, we compute new distributions for each year, as well as aggregate
statistics.
6.1 Results
Short run Eﬀects Table 11 reports the aggregate levels of investment, sales, ex-
ports an foreign debt generated by the model for 1995 (normalizing their 1989-94
23levels to 100) and compares them to the data 9. All magnitudes are computed in
units of domestic output. We reproduce fairly well the export boom and the increase
in the burden of foreign debt, which gives us some conﬁdence to assess the compet-
itiveness and balance sheet eﬀects on investment. The model predicts an immediate
fall on investment of 21%, short of the 24% drop observed in the 1995 data compared
to the averages of 1989-94.
We conclude that the drop of investment in the model is largely due to a strong
balance sheet eﬀect, as the debt burden (in domestic units) increases after the real
depreciation, both in the data and in our model. This eﬀect dominates the competi-
tiveness eﬀect of the increase in exports, so that ﬁrms net worth decreases and, given
capital market imperfections, they have to adjust decreasing investment expenditures.
Our explanation is able to account for about 85% of the drop in investment in the
short run.
Medium run Eﬀects In the medium run, the time series obtained using the bench-
mark model for 1995-98 are plotted in Figure 3, which also shows the evolution of
the corresponding variables in the data. A simple inspection shows that the model
cannot account for the sustained high levels of exports between 1996-98, when the
real exchange rate appreciates, nor for the increase in domestic sales. The positive
net worth eﬀects generated by these two eﬀects are consistent with a rapid recovery
and further increase of investment in the data, which does not occur in the model.
We think that to some extent (from which we do not have a quantitative as-
sessment, unfortunately) the actual 1995-98 path of the Mexican economy cannot
be attributed to a recovery from the devaluation shock, only. This period featured
other important shocks as well, as some structural reforms were implemented. One of
9Notice that we are not using as a starting point for this comparison the actual values in the
data for 1994. Given the characteristics of the experiment, we prefer to interpret the pre-devaluation
situation as described by the averages of 1989-94 variables in the data, and compare the evolution
of the relevant variables after the devaluation to these initial averages.
24such structural changes is the opening of the US market to Mexican imports through
NAFTA, which might be responsible for the sustained export boom even after an
important appreciation of the real exchange rate after 1995. Since our experiment
only captures the impulse response function of the model to one large real exchange
rate increase, abstracting from other shocks to the economy, we are unable to account
for the path of investment in the years after the crisis.
7 Conclusions
We have built a model in which movements of the real exchange rate have important
eﬀects on ﬁrms’ dynamics, productivity, and investment. The key channels seem to
be the competitiveness eﬀect, aﬀecting exports, and the balance sheet eﬀect, aﬀecting
foreign debt burden. We use the model to analyze the eﬀects of the 1994-95 Mexican
devaluation and obtain consistent results in terms of: (i) an increase in the debt
burden, (ii) an increase in exports, and (iii) a decline in investment, immediately
after the devaluation.
The experiment, however, has some shortcomings, especially in its ability to pre-
dict the medium term eﬀects of the devaluation. First, we do not account for the
sustained export boom in Mexico following the 1995 crisis, which are likely to be a
by-product of structural reforms (as NAFTA). This boom had echoes in investment
and sales in the economy, which are also underpredicted by our model. Including
these reforms in the analysis is an interesting topic for future research.
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Proposition 1 The optimal export decision can be represented by a function x(K,e,θ,η).
Moreover,













(ii) x is strictly decreasing in K and θ,i fx<1;
(iii) x is strictly increasing in η and e,i fx<1;a n d
(iv) lime→0 x(K,e,θ,η)=0and lime→+∞ x(K,e,θ,η)=1 .
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution to the maximization






/θf (K). Since g
is strictly increasing, this interior solution always satisﬁes the non-negativity con-


















/θf (K) is strictly decreasing in K and θ, as stated in (ii).
Since g is strictly concave, it is also strictly increasing in η and e, which proves













=+ ∞. The limits in (iv) are then immediate from (i).
Proposition 2 The collateral function Π(K,e,θ,η):
( i )i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nK and θ,
(ii) is strictly increasing in η and e. Moreover,
(iii) Π(K,e,θ,η)/e is decreasing in e;a n d
(iv) lime→0 Π(K,e,θ,η)/e =+ ∞ and lime→+∞ Π(K,e,θ,η)/e = ηg[θf (K)].
Proof. Using Proposition 1(i), we can write
Π = eηg[x(K,e,θ,η)θf (K)] + (1 − x(K,e,θ,η))θf (K)










. To prove (i), (ii) and (iii), we
analyze separately the cases in which the export decision is interior and the corner






























































= ηg[x(K,e,θ,η)θf (K)] > 0
since g is strictly increasing; similarly,
∂Π
∂η
















































(1 − x(K,e,θ,η))θf (K) < 0
which proves (iii). Second, at the corner x =1 ,
Π = eηg[θf (K)]




















This completes the proof.




/e, any debt contract implies π =0
and a return for the foreign lender below the risk free rate.
(ii) If (1 + ρ)B0 ≤ Π(K0,e,θ,η)/e, the debt contract with R0 =1+ρ implies
π =1 . This contract satisﬁes the zero proﬁt condition for the foreign lender.
Proof. (i) Proposition 2(iii) implies Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η)/e0 < (1 + ρ)B0 for all re-
alizations of (e0,θ
0) ∈ (e,e] × [θ,θ]. Hence, if R0 ≥ 1+ρ, πf = 0. The lender
obtains the value of the collateral Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η)/e0, which is less than the risk free
rate. Of course, if R0 < 1+ρ the lender will also get less than the risk-free rate,
independently of the probability of repayment. (ii) Proposition 2(iii) implies that
Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η)/e0 ≥ (1 + ρ)B0 for all realizations of (e0,θ
0) ∈ [e,e] × [θ,θ]. Hence, if
R0 =1+ρ, πf = 1. The lender obtains with probability one (1 + ρ)B0, satisfying the
zero proﬁt condition (3).
Proposition 4 Let θ
0 ∈ [θ,θ] be such that Π(K0,e,θ
0,η) < eR0B0 < Π(K0,e,θ
0,η)
and deﬁne ˆ e(K0,R 0,B0,θ
0,η) as the solution to Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η)=e0R0B0.T h e n
(i) there exists a unique e < ˆ e<e;
(ii) Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η) >e 0R0B0, ∀e0 < ˆ e and Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η) <e 0R0B0, ∀e0 > ˆ e;
(iii) ˆ e is strictly increasing in K0, θ
0,a n dη, and strictly decreasing in R0 and B0;
(iv) πθ0 = F (ˆ e|e) ∈ (0,1);a n d
(v) πθ0 is strictly increasing in K0, θ
0,a n dη, and strictly decreasing in R0 and B0.
Proof. Consider the condition Π(K0,ˆ e,θ







Proposition 2 establishes that the left hand side of the previous expression is decreas-
ing in e0, with lime0→0 Π(K0,e 0,θ
0,η)/e0 =+ ∞.M o r e o v e r ,Π(K0,e,θ,η)/e<R 0B0,
since from the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n( 3 )i ti sc l e a rt h a tR0 ≥ 1+ρ. Therefore, there
exists a unique value 0 < ˆ e<e that equates the left hand side and the right hand
side. To show that ˆ e>e, note that otherwise the probability of repayment would be
30zero, therefore the lender would lower R0 until making zero-proﬁts. This completes
the proof of (i) and (ii). Proposition 2(ii) implies that as K0, θ
0,o rη increase, the
left hand side shifts up, so ˆ e increases. With a similar argument, as R0 or B0 increase,
the right hand side shifts up, so ˆ e decreases, as stated in (iii). The result in (iv) only
restates (ii), given the deﬁnition of πθ0, and implies using (iii):
∂πθ0




























/e > (1 + ρ)B0 > Π(K0,e,θ,η)/e and let the equi-
librium interest rate be R0 (K0,B0,e,θ,η).T h e n ,R0 is:
(i) strictly decreasing in K0;
(ii) strictly increasing in B0;
(iii) strictly decreasing in η.






































































































































































dF (e0|e). Combining the previous results and using



























































0|θ) − (1 + ρ)=πR
0 − (1 + ρ) < 0
since otherwise Γ > 0. Using again the implicit function theorem
dR0
dB0 = −
πR0 − (1 + ρ)
πB0 > 0



































































b e g[x(K0,e 0,θ
0,η)θf (K)]dF (e0|e)dP (θ
0|θ)
πB0 > 0
completing the proof of (iii)




/e > (1 + ρ)B0 > Π(K0,e,θ,η)/e and let the equi-




















(i) strictly increasing in e if φ(K0e,θ,η) < 0;
(i) strictly decreasing in e if φ(K0e,θ,η) > 0;a n d
(iii) independent of e for φ(K0e,θ,η)=0 .
































































































which proves (i), (ii), and (iii).
34Table 1: Industry Distribution of Firms
Year Firms Mfg. Transport Services Construction Mining Other
1989 98 0.64 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.16
1990 200 0.61 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.17
1991 224 0.58 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.17
1992 226 0.54 0.01 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.16
1993 221 0.49 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.16
1994 199 0.48 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.02 0.14
1995 182 0.47 0.03 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.14
1996 177 0.46 0.04 0.24 0.12 0.02 0.13
1997 168 0.42 0.04 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.15
1998 155 0.41 0.05 0.27 0.12 0.02 0.14
1999 137 0.41 0.05 0.28 0.12 0.02 0.12
2000 113 0.45 0.04 0.27 0.12 0.02 0.10














1989 4.644 1.512 0.124 0.136 0.740 1.421 0.058
1990 4.612 1.293 0.140 0.126 1.125 1.824 0.015
1991 4.220 1.315 0.108 0.104 1.552 2.479 0.009
1992 3.961 1.243 0.144 0.085 1.492 2.867 0.012
1993 3.437 1.262 0.127 0.081 1.563 3.792 0.025
1994 3.503 1.167 0.158 0.103 1.769 4.163 0.145
Avg. 1.277 0.135 0.103 1.403 2.812 0.0527
Note: FC
Liab is the ratio of net interest payments to total liabilities. ST Debt refers to
short term debt.
Table 3: Correlations Between Key Variables, 1989-1994
Correlation Between
Capital and Short Term Debt 0.664
Capital and Total Debt 0.748
Capital and Exports 0.641
Short Term Debt and Exports 0.659
Total Debt and Exports 0.641
36Table 4: Joint Distributions of Total Debt, Capital and Exports, 1989-1994
Total Debt Capital Exports Sales
0 0.014 0.001 0.032
0 to 25th percentile 0.012 0.002 0.012
25th to 50th percentile 0.082 0.019 0.137
50th to 75th percentile 0.154 0.103 0.174
Above 75th percentile 0.739 0.875 0.645
Figures represent proportions of capital, exports and sales of each category of ﬁrms
in total capital, exports and sales respectively for the period 1989 to 1994.














1994 3.503 1.167 0.158 0.103 1.769 4.163 0.145
1995 5.409 1.355 0.100 0.202 1.229 2.527 0.062
1996 4.754 1.219 0.119 0.197 0.966 2.059 -0.033
1997 3.964 1.112 0.073 0.199 0.697 2.059 0.008
1998 3.909 1.106 0.132 0.204 0.741 1.853 0.064
1999 3.588 1.129 0.072 0.184 0.710 1.881 -0.004
2000 3.180 0.880 0.069 0.245 0.570 1.323 0.030
Note: FC
Liab is the ratio of net interest payments to total liabilities. ST Debt refers to
short term debt.
37Table 6: Changes in Average Magnitudes, 1994=100
Year Capital Investment Sales Exports ST Debt Total Debt
1994 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
1995 111.683 61.842 98.239 192.244 133.523 116.693
1996 110.380 78.449 104.699 199.858 109.146 98.850
1997 114.496 55.352 119.031 229.985 90.619 113.721
1998 124.469 106.283 127.716 253.283 106.048 112.743
1999 125.251 58.891 130.103 219.336 88.041 99.109
2000 122.672 76.509 175.388 354.541 113.449 111.794
Table 7: Balance Sheet Eﬀects
Exports Below Median Exports Above Median
Debt Below Median 17.592 7.146
(16.267) (5.535)
Debt Above Median 217.979 226.709
(108.943) (201.616)
The top ﬁgure in each cell represents the average investment of ﬁr m si ne a c hc a t e g o r y
between 1989 and 1994. The lower ﬁgure represents the average investment between
1995 and 2000. All ﬁgures are in millions of 1994 pesos. Debt refers to total debt.
38Table 8: Sample Statistics as a Percentage of Macro Aggregates
Year Investment Dollar Debt Exports
1989 8.1 53.0 13.0
1990 14.0 67.0 20.4
1991 10.3 68.0 18.2
1992 13.4 69.0 15.6
1993 12.9 83.0 15.3
1994 15.9 87.0 17.6
1995 12.0 69.0 18.3
1996 12.5 60.0 15.8
1997 6.5 71.0 16.9
1998 10.6 43.0 14.6
1999 5.0 31.0 11.9
2000 5.0 32.0 17.0
Source: Banco de Mexico. Exports do not include petroleum. Dollar debt refers to
total private sector dollar debt.
Table 9: Calibration of Benchmark Model
Target Data (89-94) Model Parameter Value
1. Capital/Sales 1.27 1.31 α 0.36
2. Investment/Sales 0.14 0.14 δ 0.11
3. Exports/Sales 0.10 0.09 ξ 0.63
4. Debt/Exports 2.25 2.19 φ 55.00
5. Exit rate 0.11 0.11 λ 0.06
39Table 10: Other Statistics for Benchmark Model
Statistic Data (89-94) Model
1. Correlation betweeen Capital and:
- Foreign debt 0.75 0.44
- Productivity (θ) 0.49 0.87
- Exports 0.64 0.12
2. Correlation betweeen debt and:
- Productivity (θ) 0.36 0.14
- Exports 0.64 0.24
3. Statistics for exits relative to total:
- Avg. capital 0.51 0.52
-A v g .d e b t 0.22 0.59
-A v g .p r o d u c t i v i t y( θ) 1.60 0.54
- Avg. export type (η) 0.10 0.72
Table 11: Results of Devaluation Experiment
89-94 1995
Data Model Data Model
Investment 100.01 0 0 .0 86.08 8 .7
Total Sales 100.01 0 0 .0 116.01 0 5 .7
Domestic Sales 100.01 0 0 .0 104.09 4 .0
Exports 100.01 0 0 .0 229.02 2 2 .5
Foreign Debt 100.01 0 0 .0 163.01 5 1 .1
40Figure 1: Optimal Export Decision
 







41Figure 2: Balance Sheet Eﬀects of a Devaluation
 






42Figure 3: Medium-run Results of the Devaluation Experiment
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